

Mexican Revolution as a Passive Revolution and the Guideline of this Concept for Understanding and Acting on the Present

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Introduction

The Gramscian concept of passive revolution refers to the fact that in a situation of historical change it is only the dominant groups and classes that are able to develop all their possibilities for action, so as not to allow themselves to be overtaken by the subordinate groups and classes. They achieve this by assuming the historical requirements of social development and other and even contrary elements, pertaining to the subaltern groups and classes, within their own historical project (Gramsci, 1975, 1768).

In the following lines I suggest a reading of the Mexican Revolution as a confluence of three revolutionary processes, of which the Cardenista passive revolution is the one that definitively inaugurated the passage of Mexico to a new capitalistic phase of development, assuming the form of the import substitution industrialization.

At the present time Mexico is immersed in a neoliberal crisis, as a path to a new capitalistic phase of development or knowledge capitalism. In this context I argue about the need of a new passive revolution for a progressive outcome. The new passive revolution, being part of a re-foundation process of the whole socio-spatial and institutional framework, might consist of a cognitive-productive and proactive social inclusion, implying a push forward of political-historical issues of subaltern groups and classes in order to undertake a catching-up process to the new capitalistic phase of development.

To unfold the argument the presentation is divided in three parts: the first one deals with passive revolution and other Gramscian insolubly related concepts; the second suggests a reading of the Mexican Revolution as a passive revolution; and the third poses the guideline of the concept for understanding and acting on the present.

1. Passive revolution and related gramscian concepts

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Gramsci's contribution to Marxism is based on the understanding of the historicity of capitalism, not only as a mode of production that prepares the historical-material conditions for scientific socialism (which is Marx's contribution), but as changing (historical) unities between economy, politics, ideology, and culture that represent historical phases of development within the mode of production. It is, in fact, this understanding that distinguishes Gramsci from the rest of the early Marxist theoreticians after Marx.

In this sense, the problem that Gramsci poses in *Prison Notebooks* is how to explain, based on the Marxist theoretical framework, the emergence and decline of the historical phases of development of capitalism, without the (historical) crises that intervene in this transition resulting in a process of social revolution that leads to the scientific socialism foreseen by Marx. This unfolding of these developments was already evident at the time in which the *Notebooks* were written with the emergence of americanism and fascism.

The tremendous timeliness of Gramscian thought resides in the appreciation that, at the current time, just as in the 1930s, the transition to a new phase of the development of capitalism, for which the term Knowledge Capitalism is proposed, is verifiable, for which a new technological-productive base has thus far been developed without its projection having yet taken place in the socio-spatial institutional framework.

Gramsci's contribution to marxism consists of the formulation of a series of articulated concepts that can be considered methodological mediation concepts in a double sense: 1) in between the dual historical dimension of capitalism, either understood as a mode of production, or as a succession of historical phases of development; and 2) in that perspective, in between the economic structure and classes and social groups and their possibilities of engaging in action. These concepts are *hegemony*, *passive revolution*, *historical bloc*, *system of hegemony of states*, and others that are derived from them, with hegemony being the fundamental concept, since the others are the result of elaborations constructed and based on the concept of hegemony. We will now develop these general concepts in light of the transition from one historical phase of development to another, based on the previously explained reasons.

Historical crisis of capitalism are understood as the moments in which, with insurmountable contradictions having arisen in the economy, the political forces that operate in favor of the latter's preservation attempt to resolve such contradictions within the limits of its current configuration, while other forces organize, seeking to demonstrate (with their own victory) that the necessary and sufficient conditions already exist to provide for their solution in a new phase of the development of

capitalism (Gramsci, 1975, 455,1578). That is, within a new combination between economy, politics, ideology and culture. With this, the progressive political forces promote the transition from one historical phase of capitalism to another.

If we consider that, according to Marx, the fundamental contradiction of capitalism (which determines its historical character as a mode of production) is between the development of the productive forces and the social relations of production - a contradiction which implies that an increasingly private appropriation of the (social) product goes hand in hand with the increasingly social character of production- the solution to a historical crisis poses for capitalism the need to take a further step toward the socialization of production, which would allow for the subsequent development of the productive forces, even conserving the private character of the appropriation of the product. In this sense, the historical mission of capitalism is to incorporate technological progress in its development, which represents the indispensable condition so that the progressive dominant groups and classes can constitute a new *hegemony* over the subordinate classes and groups, that is, they can continue exercising a capacity for domination (through means of coercion) over them, playing, at the same time, a leading historical role, by means of consensus or the capacity to convince others of their historical aims. This implies the ability of creating a new social communion and integrating philosophical conception of reality according to the solution of the precedent contradictions, with a corresponding new form of social acting by the individual subject, which includes a new common sense.

Dialectically (but not historically) the *hegemonic* function arises from the productive structure, and, particularly, from the leading role of the hegemonic group or class in the production process, and subsequently, this is extended and generalized in the complex socio-spatial and institutional framework, thus sealing a unity in the concrete historical construction, among economics, politics, ideology, culture and spatiality (Gramsci, 1981: LXXXI-LXXXII).

But to the extent that the process implies taking a step toward the socialization of production that facilitates a subsequent development of the productive forces, the dominant groups and classes need to develop and integrate as their own other outside and even opposing historical-political-cultural elements, but that are necessary for incorporating technological development and preserving their hegemony. That is, they must sustain their hegemony in a process of *passive revolution or restoration-revolution* that makes it possible that it is only these dominant groups and classes that are able to develop all their possibilities for action, so as not to allow themselves to be overtaken historically by the subordinate classes (Gramsci, 1975, 1768). Consequently, through passive revolution, the dominant groups and classes, either directly or through the state –with the latter

being the most common variant- assume the historical requirements of social development and other and even contrary elements, pertaining to the subordinate groups and classes, within their own historical project.

In conclusion, in order for the passive revolution and the hegemonic project as a whole to triumph, the dominant groups and classes that seek to demonstrate the need for a new historical unity of capitalism should recognize and base themselves on effective innovations in the field of production and, in addition, be able to project themselves in a new proactive social utopia or "catharsis", capable of unleashing the political energy of society (Gramsci, 1975, 1221).

The concrete historical unity is synthesized in the concept of *historical bloc*, which represents an organic unity between the political-economic structure and the complex socio-spatial and institutional framework, this is, the elaborate series of theoretical-practical activities of the classes and social groups, as well as individuals, around a common historical project that implies, therefore, a unity of contrary and diverse elements (Gramsci 1975, 182, 1237-38, 1337-38, 1569-70) with the political-economic structure being the reference point and dialectical origin of the socio-spatial and institutional framework. This implies that politics and the rest of the superstructures have their specificity and an active function in historical change, not being limited to being a mere reflection of the economic structure (Gramsci, 1975, 1577-78).

But if the historical bloc consists of the diverse and complex series of social and individual theoretical-practical activities (political, cultural, ideological, etc) around a common historical project, the institutions represent the crystallization of these theoretical-practical activities in formal and informal organizations, which become, in turn, reference points for new social and individual actions. Consequently, the character of agglutination and cohesion of the social action of the institutions is related to their role in the realization of this common historical project, and, therefore, in the more or less direct realization of the hegemonic function that sustains it.

In the building of institutions, as well as the historical bloc as a whole, the role of intellectuals is key, since, based on their technical-formative and leadership capacity, they differ from "simple" individuals of their social group or class, and they have the possibility to generalize and project the interests and theoretical-practical actions characteristic of that class or social group, and, in that sense, contribute to generating a class or social group identity. In a historical-social perspective, intellectuals represent the "glue" that articulates the different classes and social groups -as well as their institutions- that converge in the historical bloc, being, therefore, the "officials" in charge of exercising the hegemonic function (Gramsci, 1932-1935, N.12: 1518-1519).

In this perspective, it is possible to distinguish between different degrees of contribution to the

realization of the hegemonic function and the scope of the capacity of agglutination and cohesion of social and individual action on the part of the institutions that correspond to the different types of intellectuals due to the scope and dimension of their activity, with, in this sense, the state being the most developed institution: 1) the institutions that bring together and cohere a social class with other classes and social groups around the historical bloc, to which the organizational and connective action of *organic intellectuals* correspond; 2) the institutions that agglutinate and cohere a social class around itself; and 3) the institutions that agglutinate and cohere a social group, beyond the determining factors of class of the individuals that comprise it, with the organizational and connective action of *traditional intellectuals'* corresponding to points 2 and 3. Organic intellectuals being those capable of projecting the interests and activities of a class or social group in a historical project that articulates the class or social group to the rest of society from a hegemonic position, thus, they can belong even by their material conditions of living and/or ideologically to either of the antagonistic classes only, meanwhile traditional intellectuals are those that generalize and project the interests and activities of a class or social group, contributing to the creation of a specific identity (Gramsci, 1975, 1513-14, 1550-51).

The historical bloc crystallizes in the state, which is the entity that synthesizes the political relations of society. Such an entity should allow for the maximum development and maximum expansion of the hegemonic group, presenting it as the development and expansion of society as a whole.

2. Mexican Revolution as a passive revolution

The events commonly known as the “Mexican Revolution” really consist of the ensemble of three revolutionary processes taking place during the long period from 1910 to 1940. The first one, was a liberal-democratic (bourgeois) revolution fighting for the democratization of the liberal porfirist state and the access to state power by the agricultural bourgeoisie grown during the porfiriato period. This revolution initially led by Madero² and Carranza³, radicalized itself after taking power and when it was already under the leadership of Obregón and Calles, to counter the second one, the peasant revolution of Zapata and Villa, by sealing a temporary alliance with the labor movement in

2 Even if Madero was conscious of the social problems and his idea of people was not elitist, by 1912 the discussion about the agrarian problem hadn't changed his liberal idea of society. “Madero continued keeping the goal 'of constituting the small proprietary' without accepting the expropriation of the big land properties” (Córdova, 1973).

3 In Carranza's thinking the reforms should be conducted by the state and not by the masses; neither groups or single people were in condition to realize them. In reality -Córdova argues- Carranza's ideas about social problems never stopped being individualist and liberal, conceiving a classic relation between the state and the individual, in which the former should be the principal actor being able of leading the development of the “individualist society” (Córdova, 1973).

terms of incorporating some of the latter's social aspirations, such as unions recognition and collective bargaining, into its policy making, signifying a first partial try of passive revolution process (Garmendia, 2016).

As for the peasant revolution, it fought for the restitution of land to the peasants and was finally defeated by the guns of Obregón.

The third revolution was a passive revolution led by Lázaro Cárdenas (1936-1940)⁴, in which the historical interests and aspirations of both labor and peasants classes were incorporated and articulated into a new historical project. This project was led by the new dominant classes emerged from the confrontation of the two preceding revolutionary processes and the resulting triumph of the liberal-further radicalized one. Under the terms of this new historical project the state should gain a sufficient relative autonomy to promote national development founded on an import substitution national industrial strategy.

Thus, the so call “institutionalization of the Mexican Revolution” consists of the conformation of a new corporatist historical bloc, resulting from a passive revolution during Cárdenas presidency. This passive revolution took place in a country mostly agrarian and highly financially dependent on the great powers, with a very weak national industry (weaker than Brazil's and Argentina's) (Cárdenas, 1988), resulting on a still nascent industrial bourgeoisie. Furthermore, the agro-mining bourgeoisie, which constituted the hegemonic group, was very dependent on foreign capital and on the commercial and political-diplomatic relations with the US.

Cárdenas placed then national industrialization at the very center of his project of nation, with the state substituting the industrial bourgeoisie on the commitment for industrialization: the dependency on the US and on foreign capital, as well as the resistance of hegemonic groups fractions, even that of the industrial bourgeoisie⁵, could only be confronted with a push-forward of social aspirations and the mobilization of both labor and peasant classes, which provided the state with a new economical-political sovereignty, making possible a state's promotion of industrialization policy based on its direct economical action.

That is why a conflict over a new collective contract between the union and the oil foreign companies, which was preceded by an intense union mobilization (Hamilton, 1983), was taken into advantage by the government to expropriate those companies and thus to get national control over

4 Even if in the conception of the Constitution of 1917, in Carranza's project, peasant and labor fights' aims were already included.

5 The COPARMEX opposed actively Cárdenas policies. This conflict reaches its climax in 1936, during the strike at the Vidriera firm. The agricultures-proprietaries were against the deepening of the agrarian reform, which became evident since 1933, when the “agrarians”, defending it, defeated the “callistas” , who were opposed, even if that opposition remained localized at the state level (Hamilton, 1983).

oil production and resources with union support⁶. Therefore, the initial conflict over a new collective contract became a labor administration of a nationalized oil industry, which was defended by workers contingents momentarily integrated into the army.

Concerning the peasants, Cárdenas government took advantage of a general strike of the cotton plantations workers at the lagunera region in 1936, preceded by an intense movement of peasants organization, to deepen the agrarian reform by expropriating foreign and national land owners, as well as great farmers groups (Hamilton, 1983)⁷, which contributed to the gain of both state sovereignty and relative autonomy.

Additionally, the Zapata and Villa peasant revolution's aims of land restitution was pushed-forward by the extension of the collective ejido as a rural form of production functional to national industrialization, in which the former should produce the food for the workers of the latter (Cárdenas [1936], cited by Córdova [1984]).

Consequently, with the aim of promoting industrialization the state modernized itself by absorbing and incorporating the aspirations and mobilization of the fundamental subaltern classes, in terms of the new hegemony of the industrial bourgeoisie. With that aim too the state substituted the latter, signifying that the economic “delay” was compensated by a push-forward of politics, resulting on a conquest of state's sovereignty and a great relative autonomy from the hegemonic group.

This process of passive revolution was quickly institutionalized (only twelve days after oil industry expropriation) by the inauguration of the PRI predecessor as a state's party: the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM)⁸, whose organizational structure was based on great corporations (or “sectors”) corresponding to subaltern groups: labor, peasant, popular and military corporations.

The integration of labor and peasants into the PRM constituted the last stage of the passive revolution: their organizations became states' corporations participating in the management of the political system and the economy by contributing to fixing state's social expenses. Additionally, unions intervened in the management of work force social reproduction (following the model of the benefactor state) and peasants organizations on the management of the agrarian reform.

That process was complemented with the constitution of the institutional framework for the

6 Such an act of expanding state's sovereignty was preceded by policies with similar orientations: the constitution of Comisión Federal de Electricidad, Petróleos de México and the National Oil Administration, the 1936 expropriation law, the mines law, the constitution of the Mining Promoting Commission, and the nationalization of the minority foreign participation in railroad capital (Hamilton, 1983).

7 The Lagunera region had irrigation and 70% of the land was foreign owned (40% by two English firms (Hamilton, 1983).

8 The PRM program included goals such as the fight for “labor's democracy” and “socialist education” (Hamilton, 1983).

appliance of the Ley Federal del Trabajo (LFT), whose clauses of exclusivity and exclusion⁹ provided the state with a discriminatory power over union representation, over determining its role in labor and industrial management relations.

Differing from fordism-keyesianism of developed countries, institutionalization of social conflict resolution by the Mexican state adopted a tutelary form in which the state “protected” labor *vis-à-vis* capital. That was in line with a command and direction shared action in the productive process between the production technicians, as capital representatives, and union leaders, as state bureaucrats.

The passive revolution made then possible to carry on with an import substitution industrial strategy (ISIS) managed by the state, by means of public investment and whose production was realized in the internal market.

Three ISIS periods must be distinguished. The first one from 1929 to 1945, when import capacity had been reduced and external restrictions were “absolute”, the import substitution took place on non durables means of consumption. In the second period, from 1945 to 1955, import restrictions were reduced by the improvement of exports buying capacity, with import substitution taking place on durable mean of consumption, as well as intermediary and capital goods. During this period the state benefited the small and medium entrepreneurs emerged from the industrialization process and organized in the Cámara Nacional de la Industria de la Transformación (CANACINTRA).

The third period from 1955 to the late 60's, was the period of greatest growth and maturity, in which an unfinished transit towards an export substitution process based on a heavy capital goods industry took place. The benefited groups were the great national and foreign industrials having access to credit and belonging to the Confederación de Cámaras Industriales (CONCAMIN), with the great national industrials having their main origins back in the agro-mining bourgeoisie which provided agro-mining exports from the second period on.

The contradictions of the ISI and the corporatist historical bloc were abruptly precipitated by the 68 student-popular movement, becoming an “union insurgency” and a guerrillero movement during the 70's, which reflected an hegemonic historical bloc crisis. The dominant groups tried to solve the crisis during the 70's within the limits of the ISIS and the corporatist historical bloc, resulting on the 1982 international debt crisis inaugurated by Mexico, which closed this period and opened-up the transit towards a new reality, as we will see next.

3. New technological-productive base and neoliberalism

9 The first established that the union having the majority in a company was the titular of the collective contract, whereas the second constricted workers to be member of a union to be hired..

In the eighties the dominant groups began searching for solutions to the ISIS and the corporatist historical bloc crisis outside the limits of the former, by promoting an industrial restructuring process. This process, brought about by economic liberalization, FDI and privatizations, resulted on the formation of elements of a new technological-productive base founded on an electronic, informatics and telecommunications sector (EITS), as a new coordinator and dynamic nucleus of production, corresponding to a new capitalistic phase of development or knowledge capitalism, as discussed in Ordóñez and Sánchez 2016, 10.

Nevertheless, this new nucleus of production coexists yet with the nucleus of production of ISIS, corresponding to the fordist-keynesian capitalistic phase of development, and consisting of the auto, metal-mecanic and petroleum-chemical industrial complex, even it has been technologically transformed by the new technological-productive base.

The ISIS nucleus of production continues to have a significant, yet declining, productive coordinator and dynamic capacity as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1 shows too that in the ISIS nucleus (on the half left of the Figure) the backward coordinator

and dynamic capacity is predominant over the forward capacity, whereas in the new nucleus the opposite takes place (on the half right).

In Mexico neoliberalism, as a path of development, consists of the articulation of the technological-productive base shown in Figure 1, with a reconfigured corporatist historical bloc rationalized to the goals of a free flow of financial capital, and by means of it of productive capital (economic liberalization), and of a “glocalized” spatiality too, in which local-regional subnational scales tend to be articulated directly to the trans and supranationally of globalization, without the mediation of the national scale (Ordóñez 2017A, 11).

The corporatist historical bloc experienced a reconfiguration in the following terms: 1) a new international alliance of the agro-mining bourgeoisie and its evolution into a financial and industrial transnationalized capital fraction (the hegemonic group) with foreign financial and productive transnationalized capital as well as with the international institutions promoting neoliberalism, as a way of compensating the hegemonic group's weak position *vis-à-vis* the subaltern classes and groups, derived from the hegemonic historical bloc crisis inherited from the 70's; 2) the breaking-up of the historical compromise with the national industrial bourgeoisie and with its state's political bureaucracy representative faction, concerning the accumulation and profit generating processes based on the captive internal market, and the ISIS management, respectively; 3) the suppression of the previous corporative and re-distributional compromises with the subaltern classes and groups; and 4) a new compromise with middle classes groups resulting from their access to new low cost imported products, as a consequence of an overvalued currency accompanying economic liberalization (Ordóñez 2017, 20).

The capital accumulation based on those political foundations had lagged at a growth pace of 2.7% from 2003 to 2015, with manufacturing industry and EITS considered together growing slightly faster at 3.2%, as stated in Table 1.

Gross Domestic Product of Mexico by type of activity (annual growth rates) 2003-2015

Concept	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Average period growth rate
Total Gross Domestic Product	10640929	4.7	4.7	3.7	4.0	3.7	-1.1	-1.0	4.6	4.3	3.6	1.1	2.7	2.7
<i>Taxes on products, net</i>	273576.9	4.6	4.6	3.8	4.0	3.8	-1.1	-1.0	4.7	4.2	3.6	1.2	5.2	3.2
Agriculture, cattle raising, forestry and fishing	409473.6	5.5	5.5	-7.6	12.4	1.2	5.2	-6.6	0.7	0.3	8.9	1.5	2.1	1.8
Industry	3943753	3.7	3.7	3.8	2.7	2.1	-2.6	-2.3	4.1	3.9	1.1	0.3	2.9	1.6
Industry plus EITS	4112942	4.3	4.3	4.3	3.5	3.0	-2.1	-1.6	3.7	4.2	2.7	0.2	2.6	2.2
Mining	1123438	-1.1	-1.1	1.5	-3.1	-1.6	-1.5	-4.6	0.2	1.9	0.7	0.6	-4.9	-1.4
Generation, transmission and distribution of electricity, water and gas supply	179037.6	12.5	12.5	5.2	14.9	6.3	-0.1	-0.7	10.5	5.3	0.1	3.6	7.4	5.5
Construction	792404.5	8.0	8.0	6.5	9.4	7.7	-1.1	-4.7	3.9	4.9	0.1	-4.8	5.5	2.8
Manufacturing industry plus EITS	2018061	5.2	5.2	4.9	3.4	2.8	-3.0	1.0	4.4	4.8	4.9	1.7	3.9	3.2
Services	5844936	4.8	4.8	4.1	3.9	4.4	-0.8	-0.3	5.4	4.7	3.8	1.7	2.7	3.1
Social Reproduction	3887254	5.6	5.6	4.5	4.4	4.4	-1.1	0.7	7.1	4.9	3.7	1.9	2.9	3.5
Trade	1500722	8.1	8.1	6.2	3.8	3.1	-5.9	-2.0	10.0	7.2	4.3	1.8	5.4	3.8
Financial and insurance services	197023.9	20.5	20.5	8.8	16.2	16.9	5.4	13.6	24.1	7.6	7.4	6.8	-0.2	10.9
Real estate and rental of movable and intangible goods	1246069	2.0	2.0	3.2	4.5	4.0	2.6	1.9	2.9	3.0	2.0	0.5	2.1	2.6
Health and social work services	213441	2.2	2.2	3.6	7.6	0.2	1.9	0.3	4.5	0.7	2.3	-0.3	-1.4	1.6
Cultural and sports leisure services	55887.1	2.5	2.5	-0.6	4.1	4.1	-4.4	-0.2	5.0	-2.2	7.7	3.0	-2.7	1.6
Temporary accommodation and preparation of food and beverages	247552.2	5.2	5.2	-2.1	6.7	1.7	-2.8	-5.7	1.3	3.8	5.5	1.7	3.4	2.2
Government activities	426559.9	2.6	2.6	4.2	-3.2	6.5	1.5	0.4	0.3	2.4	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6
Services related to knowledge generation	712774.1	0.1	0.1	1.9	2.5	4.4	3.4	-1.5	-1.9	3.9	2.5	0.7	1.9	1.6
Professional, scientific and technical services	256401.2	-0.8	-0.8	2.5	6.4	8.3	4.3	-7.8	0.3	5.9	3.3	0.7	5.9	2.6
Educational services	456373	0.6	0.6	1.5	0.3	2.0	2.8	2.6	-3.1	2.7	2.0	0.7	-0.6	1.0
Production services	1244908	5.3	5.3	4.1	2.9	4.3	-2.2	-2.6	3.7	4.5	4.8	1.7	2.4	2.6
Transportation, post and storage	627511.7	3.9	3.9	2.4	2.7	4.2	-3.7	0.0	5.2	3.8	3.2	2.7	3.9	2.7
Corporate services	60163.88	2.7	2.7	8.4	-0.3	4.7	4.5	4.2	-2.8	9.7	10.4	-12.3	12.9	3.7
Business support and waste management services	330720	8.4	8.4	7.5	4.2	5.1	-3.1	-9.7	4.3	6.1	7.7	3.2	-2.3	2.5
Other services except government activities	226512.3	5.2	5.2	2.8	2.3	3.0	1.5	-0.2	0.7	2.5	3.2	1.3	2.8	2.3

Note: Pesos of 2008, total gross production (includes exports and imports)

Source: INEGI

It is an accumulation process in which social reproduction services grew faster (3.5%) than productive activities, because of financial (11%) and trade (3.8%) intermediation growth, whereas services linked to knowledge generation grew at a very slow pace of 1.6% (even if educational services grew at a pace close to the economy average).

This lagging accumulation is accompanied with an increasing social inequality and polarization, as well as regional disequilibria, in which a richer North increasingly integrated to the NAFTA market grows faster than the poorer South, more integrated to the internal market, with local exceptions in both regions.

The former constitute the economical-spatial background of the actual hegemonic-social crisis, with its more relevant expressions being the insecurity climate, involving corruption and spreading narcotraffic.

Resolving the former complex of contradictions would require to further develop the technological-productive base, in such a way as to make possible that the EITS deploys all its coordinator and dynamics capacity of production, which are strongly limited by its actual development modality, characterized by: (a) the *maquiladora* electronics industry's high import/export coefficients; (b) the high levels of production and networks monopolization in the telecommunications services and content industries; and (c) the in house production predominance in the software and computational services industries. This EITS modality of development is insolubly related to the neoliberal

development path undertaken by Mexico, as discussed in depth in Ordóñez 2017B.

So, it would be necessary to breaking-up with neoliberalism and go on in a posneoliberal trajectory, implying a (great) political change and institutional innovation, which would have to bring about the conformation of a new historical bloc founded on social learning and innovation, with passive revolution playing a key role.

The new historical bloc would have to emerge from the resolution of the internal hegemonic crisis of the ruling classes, entailing the need of a new passive revolution over subaltern classes and groups could crystallize in a knowledge social economy, as will be explained latter. Thus, the resolution of the internal hegemonic crisis would require: 1) the subordination of hegemonic classes and groups alliance with foreign financial and industrial transnationalized capital and with the international institutions promoting neoliberalism, to the terms of the knowledge social economy; 2) a new compromise with the nation based industrial bourgeoisie in terms of the internal integration of value chains, the articulation of the latter with global productive networks, the incorporation of national firms to those processes, including the SME, and the reactivation of the internal market; 3) a new passive revolution consisting of the active incorporation, mobilization and projection of the interests and aims of middle classes groups and the whole subaltern classes and groups¹⁰, by means of a production-oriented and proactive social inclusion to the creation of an internal knowledge cycle, to which each of those classes and groups could make their specific contributions according to their own conditions and capabilities, beyond performing themselves an active, participative and creative role confronting the opposition of dominant classes and groups anchored on renting, monopolizing and parasitizing practices; 4) a knowledge social economy would have a key role to play as a formula to social inclusion in the creation of a internal knowledge cycle, implying a social economy oriented to productive processes satisfying directly social needs (without market intermediation or with a subordinated one), based on innovation, learning and capabilities creation.

The social knowledge economy consists of different productive forms of use-value having diverging cognitive intensities. Those productive forms take place by means of a free direct associative base of network modular production, which are independent from private industrial, commercial and financial circuits. The members make free self-organized contributions from civil society organizations, and the growing immaterial part of those use-value generated is stored in commons reservoirs of knowledge, codes and designs (P2P Foundation, 2015). The role of universities and their articulation to civil society is crucial to the creation, accumulation and distribution of knowledge, with the former having to be complemented with autonomous forms of

10 Working class, peasants, unemployed, without land, urban-popular movements, multi-class movements, cultural collectives, etc.

financing (MacLeod et al., 1997) and new innovative “bottom-up” relations of a self-organized civil society with the state, bringing about a mutual reinforcement.

The articulation of the elements of the new technological-productive base with a historical bloc founded on innovation and learning and on a social knowledge economy as explained before, would make possible a further development of the technological-productive base in terms of the consolidation of the new EITS industrial cycle, its articulation to the scientific-educative sector (SES) in order to conform an internal knowledge cycle involving the whole economic-social reproduction and the active contribution of the knowledge social economy (Ordóñez, 2004).

The latter would be the condition for a national competitive differentiation by means of social innovation and learning processes in global competition, making possible increasing knowledge-intensives product and services exports, differentiated by the specific social-national knowledge incorporated.

That is why the necessary passive revolution opens-up the opportunity for the subaltern classes and groups of advancing their historical aims to a new progressive level.

Concluding remarks

A progressive outcome from the actual Mexican neoliberal crisis, understood as a crisis of the articulation of elements of a new technological-productive base with the socio-spatial and institutional framework of the corporatist historical bloc rationalized and reconfigured, might require a new passive revolution over the subaltern classes and groups under the formula of a social knowledge economy, as a condition to the foundation of a new social innovation and learning oriented historical bloc, which might make possible a further development of the technological-productive base.

Thinking on such an outcome implies a tentative of realigning the country's actual trajectory with its recent historical background, in which a passive revolution pushing-forward (great) politics issues concerning the historical interests and aims of the subaltern classes and groups during the long period of the Mexican Revolution, permitted to put in place a catching-up process to a new capitalistic phase of development.

That is the great challenge confronting any socio-political subject aiming to unchain the national economical and social forces, projecting them to the future.

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