A Comparative Study of Ideology and Leadership in the Islamic Revolution and the Oil Nationalization Movement of Iran

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Abstract

The Oil Nationalization Movement and Islamic Revolution are two great events in the contemporary history of Iran. Despite their differences, both have left great impacts on Iran’s history and development. Thus, it is quite pertinent to comparatively study these two significant events. The main question of the present paper is: What are the differences between the ideologies and leaderships of the Oil Nationalization Movement and Islamic Revolution of Iran? Documental-historical and comparative methods have been employed for this study. The necessary data has been collected from the documents, books and journals of repute. The findings of the study indicate that the Oil Nationalization Movement was going on successfully as far as the two leaders of the movement, that is, Mohammad Mosaddegh and Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmoud Kashani and their supporters, i.e. the intellectuals and the clerics were united, which finally led to the nationalization of Iranian oil industry. The pick of this victory was witnessed in the July 20, 1952 Uprising. However, from that uprising onward the movement faced a failure due to the hiatus that surfaced between its leaders and ideologies. On the leadership level, Ayatollah Kashani took a different course of action from that of Mosaddegh. On the ideological level, the differences between the intellectual trend, which represented liberal nationalism, and that of the clerics, which represented Islamism and the Bazaar, culminated in political differences that created problems in the way of the success of the movement. In contrast, in the course of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini, relying on the past experiences, assumed the leadership and did not make any coalition with other revolutionary trends such as the Freedom Movement, National Front, Marxists, etc. In fact, other trends followed Imam Khomeini. On the ideological level, Imam Khomeini, offering a new interpretation of Islamic government, played an effective role in the formulation of the revolutionary ideology of the movement. He also formulated the main tactics for confronting the Shah’s regime. He played a crucial role in every stage of the formation of the Islamic

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Republic system. His role may be defined on three levels: First, mobilization of revolutionary forces. Using his own social base as a religious authority, he easily mobilized the masses. Moreover, the religious networks and mosques, the platforms for preaching and delivering lectures across the country made the mobilization possible. The second level was that of ideological; through a reinterpretation of such concepts as government, martyrdom, occultation, simulation, etc. he paved the way for the mobilization of the masses through the ideology of the revolution. On the third level, i.e. management, Imam Khomeini through his particular management style succeeded in assuming the leadership of almost all revolutionary forces whether religious or otherwise.

**Keywords:** Oil Nationalization Movement, Islamic Revolution, Mohammad Mosaddegh, Ayatollah Kashani, Imam Khomeini.

**Introduction**

Throughout contemporary Iranian history, five major movements have been launched to liberation the country from domestic authoritarianism and foreign imperialism: the Tobacco Protest of 1890, the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, the Nationalization of Oil Industry in 1951, the 15 Khordad (June 5) Movement of 1963, and finally, the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The first two were staged against domestic authoritarianism, but the last three aimed to challenge both domestic dictatorship and foreign imperialism.

This paper aims to compare the roles of leadership and ideology from various aspects in the two movements of Oil Nationalization and Islamic Revolution, highlighting the similarities and differences between the two through historical facts and evidence. Both movements achieved victory through effective leadership and clear ideology, and both culminated in the formation of a government. The government formed in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution was fundamentally different from monarchical ones, and in terms of its distinct legal principals, lay the foundation for a new type of Islamic government. Contrastingly, the national government resulting from the Oil Nationalization movement solely meant to revive the constitutional government formed by 1906 revolutionaries and aimed to constitutionalize – rather than overthrow – the monarchical system. Therefore, thorough examination of the functions of ideology and leadership within the two movements in addition to comparison of their respective methods of government-formation were the chief objectives of the authors.

**A. Theoretical Framework**

Revolution leaders may be categorized into three main groups: 1. Ideologist leaders, 2. Mobilizing leaders, and 3. Managing leaders. Each type of leader best fits a specific stage of a given revolution. Intellectual leaders provide the ideological and theoretical basis of a
revolutionary movement; mobilizing leaders achieve power by starting revolutionary movements, have great skill in terms of inciting the people toward political action, and are excellent orators armed with the gift of rhetoric; finally, managing leaders establish the power and institutionalize the revolution. In practice, most revolutionary leaders have been theorists, mobilizers and managers all at the same time—although to various degrees (Bashirieh, 2014: 92-3).

a. The role of ideologist leaders

In most of successful revolutions, the leaders have functioned as revolutionary theoreticians; that is, they have created ideologies and defined the principles thereof. In this section, we examine the functions of revolutionary ideologies.

• Functions of revolutionary ideologies

Censuring the status quo, describing it as intolerable, and thus declaring it impossible to reach a compromise with the agents and proponents of the ruling system constitute one of the functions of revolutionary ideologies. Indeed, the image depicted of the current state of affairs has to be so hideous as to disgust the people and thereby convince them of its being essentially invalid (Panahi, 2014: 390-1).

Another function is determining the goals of the revolution and presenting a bright image of future in the form of a utopian society, which must also be reflected in the slogans of the revolutions. As the characteristics of this utopian society must be clarified from all aspects, social revolutions need a comprehensive ideology that is able to define the short-term goals and ultimate objective of a given revolution in various areas (Ibid).

The other function of revolutionary ideologies is the ability to present a feasible plan incorporating the methods through which the society is supposed to put the current situation behind it and transition to an ideal one—in other words, a practical roadmap for the revolutionaries. Wallace terms this function as the ‘transitional culture’ of an ideology which determines the correct course of action that needs to be followed in order to establish the new state (Ibid).

b. The role of mobilizing leaders

Eric Hoffer introduces three types of revolutionary leaders during the course of a revolution: a. Men of words (orators), b. Fanatical extremists who start and mobilize the movement and are tasked with overthrowing the ruling state and establishing the new one; and c. Practical men of action who suppress any subsequent opposition and bring stability and balance to the revolution (Hoffer, 1951: 135-61). On fanatical mobilizing leaders, Hoffer states that, “Without [them,] the disaffection engendered by militant men of words remains undirected and … the initiated reforms, even when drastic, leave the old way of life unchanged, and any change in
government usually amounts to no more than a transfer of power from one set of men of action to another (Ibid: 151).”

c. The role of managing leaders

One of the significant roles of leaders immediately after successful revolutions is the establishment of a new state. Accordingly, such leaders are known as managing or state-building leaders. In the words of Theda Skocpol, “Revolutionary leaderships have been able to use state power after the initial consolidation of the new regimes to propel further socioeconomic transformations. These transformations have contributed indispensably to national survival or to the material well-being of the people as a whole. And these leaders acted to build new, strengthened state organizations to consolidate revolutionary changes and assert national autonomy (Skocpol, 1979: 286-7).”

B. The Conceptual Model of the Roles of Leadership and Ideology in Revolutions

C. Comparing the Ideology, Revolutionary Mobilization, and State-Building in the Oil Nationalization Movement and the Islamic Revolution

1. Functions of the revolutionary ideologies of intellectual leaders in the Oil Nationalization Movement and the Islamic Revolution
1.1. Functions of the revolutionary ideology of intellectual leaders in the Oil Nationalization Movement

In this section, we examine the functions of ideology in the Oil Nationalization Movement. These functions include:

1.1.1. Censuring the status quo

One of the major functions of a revolutionary ideology is censuring the current state of affairs. Revolutionary leaders try to help the people realize the undesirable conditions in which they live by lambasting the status quo. Ayatollah Kashani, as the chief ideologist of this movement, insisted that “Islam warns its followers against giving in to the yoke of foreign oppression. That is why the imperialists are working so hard to promote the separation of government and politics from religion.” In Kashani’s view, legislation is only legitimate if in accordance with the Islamic Law (Shari’a). He later ran for the National Consultative Assembly (Majlis) himself (Cottam, 2006: 185). He began his purposeful censuring of the status quo by raising awareness among the people as to the financial corruption of government officials and the miserable economic conditions of the society. Speaking in a mourning ceremony on the occasion of the Arba’een⁴, Kashani lamented the deplorable conditions of living in the country, insisting that “our current situation is unusual,” “the country is falling apart,” and “the ruling class are pillaging the nation’s wealth;” provoking the people by cautioning against the influence of Jews and the Britsh. From this point on until the date of his exile to Lebanon, he took every opportunity to expose numerous instances of the politicians’ corruption as well as social evils (Rahdar, 2009: 53-4).

1.1.2. Depicting the ideal conditions

According to Ayatollah Kashani, the chief ideologist of the Movement, ‘ideal conditions’ are achieved through the nationalization of oil industry:

The nationalization of oil industry in Iran is the only solution to our miseries; through this, firstly, the limitless wealth bestowed upon this nation by God Almighty shall be liberated from the stranglehold of the enemies of humanity—those who mean nothing but to satiate their greed by sucking up the lifeblood of abject nations and given back to its rightful owners, and second, with the establishment of national ownership of the oil, the usurping company shall no longer be able to put the very lives, properties and honor of the people at the mercy of its minions and shall fail to

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⁴ (Arabic: “fortieth”) is a Shia Muslim religious observance that occurs forty days after the Day of Ashura (10th of Muharram), commemorating the martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali, the grandson of Muhammad.
1.1.3. Proposing a strategy to transition from the status quo to ideal conditions

1.1.3.1. Raising awareness
Ayatollah Kashani’s public statements as the religious leader of the Movement contained certain points against the interference of foreigners in the Iranians’ domestic issues, aimed to raise awareness among the people toward the nationalization of oil industry, and underlined the impact of their presence and participation on the success of the movement:

The Muslim nation of Iran has indeed woken from its negligent slumber and now appreciates its rights. This nation will henceforth never stop trying until it has accomplished complete political and economic independence and shall openly declare its repulsion against the anti-independence interferences of the British and Americans to the people of the world (A group of supporters of the Islamic Movement in Iran and Europe, 1979: 87)

1.1.3.2. Establishment of the National Front
The National Front was a coalition of nationalist and religious political groups and an institutional-organizational effort; a strategy to materialize anti-colonial and anti-authoritarian thoughts. The National Front’s emphasizing the struggle against authoritarianism and efforts toward the establishment of a parliamentary democracy within the framework of ‘the Persian Constitutional Constitution’ were in alignment with Mosaddegh’s political thoughts (Kei Ostovan, 1975: 120).

1.1.3.3. Uprooting the Anglo-Persian Oil Company
This was another strategy emphasized by the Movement’s leaders which came into practice in the shape of blocking the British’s access to Iran’s oil reserves following the victory of the Movement as a result of Ayatollah Kashani’s incessant efforts. The announcements Kashani issued against the British’s clandestine moves to disrupt and sabotage the work of the Oil Company’s staff, insisted that all staff and workers avoid going on strikes that could result in harmful turbulence, and encouraged them to refuse to follow the conspiratorial schemes of the British or other agents of corruption. Moreover, when the British ambassador issued a statement warning Mosaddegh that Iran should avoid the risks associated with the unilateral termination of the contract, Ayatollah Kashani called on the people to gather in Baharestan square; he later delivered a speech to the crowd, reiterating that the British’s dispossession of the Oil Company was absolutely irreversible (Davani, 2015: 489).
1.1.3.4. Unity and concord

Another important strategy propagated by Ayatollah Kashani in the course of the Oil Nationalization Movement to the people was that of unity and concord; facing the terrible economic situation and various crises caused by sanctions imposed on Iranian oil, Kashani called for unity among the people in his public statements, encouraging them to stand the hardships and continue the movement. The following is an excerpt from one of the aforementioned statements:

...It is thus unfair for one to think that the [Mosaddegh] government is responsible for this crisis. Today, foreign agents are working especially hard to intensify the people’s concern as to widespread poverty and unemployment; their goal is to create chaos in the society by suggesting that these problems are all caused by the recession in southern oil business and the government’s incompetence so that the government should give in to their demands [and repeal the Oil Nationalization Act of 1951] under public pressure. You dear compatriots, though, are well aware that no pain shall result in no gain; no individual, community or nation has ever attained dignity and greatness without going through hardship and deprivation (Ibid).

1.2. Functions of the revolutionary ideology of intellectual leaders in the Islamic Revolution

Following the exile of Imam Khomeini (PBUH) to Najaf, Iraq, he deservedly took on the role of the revolution’s chief ideologist:

1.2.1. Censuring the status quo

One of the most important functions of ideology in the process of popular mobilization leading up to the revolution, is criticizing the social situation of the time; this was also done within the ideology of the Islamic Revolution by putting the emphasis on the following.

1.2.1.1. Hegemony of imperialism

One of the most fundamental issues criticized by Imam Khomeini (PBUH) involved the foreign hegemony over Iran. Early instances of open criticism of foreign imperialism may be found in the mid-1960s, when discussions on the ‘capitulations’ law (diplomatic immunity granted by the Shah to American military personnel in Iran) were at their height. Imam was of the opinion that the hegemony of the US and Israel was economic in nature (Akhavan Mofrad, 2001: 53).

1.2.1.2. Misery and deprivation

Essentially, tyrannical economic mechanisms and colonization can only result in misery and deprivation for the majority of a nation. In Imam Khomeini’s view, Islamic
injunctions were originally devised with the purpose of preventing such conditions and to address the issue of wealth, but, imperialists, who wish nothing more than to see us suffer in distress, oppose the implementation of Islamic injunctions (Ibid).

1.2.1.3. **Authoritarianism and oppression**

Imam Khomeini (PBUH) was an unequivocal critic of the dictatorship, tyrannical economic mechanisms and pillaging he observed in the country. He has elaborated on these issues in his book ‘Islamic Government’ as well as in his statements and speeches (Ibid).

1.2.1.4. **Corruption**

Imam believed that there would be no place for Riba\(^5\) in the banking system of an Islamic government. Moreover, Islam has declared the production and consumption of Alcohol as well as celebration of sexual depravity to be unlawful; therefore, a government actively promoting such instances of corruption among a Muslim nation is an enemy of Islam (Ibid).

1.2.1.5. **Monarchy and illegitimate parliament**

A great portion of Imam Khomeini’s writings and speeches dealt directly with the issue of illegitimacy of the monarchy system: “The prophet Muhammad (PBUH) despised no word more than ‘king’ or ‘kingdom’... Therefore, the institution of monarchy is not only unacceptable according to Islam, it is also mainly based on policies of deception and coercion (Mohammadi, 2000: 17-8).”

1.2.2. **Depicting the ideal conditions**

Within the revolutionary ideology of Imam Khomeini (PBUH), this took the shape of ‘Islamic Government’ based on his theories. The duty of an Islamic government is to implement the law of religion in a suitable context within which the individual should be set on the path to salvation. In view of Imam, the most crucial responsibilities of an Islamic government are as follows: “Proper implementation of Islamic injunctions; preserving the Islamic law and institutions; establishment of justice; prevention of tyranny, violation of rights, and dictatorship; providing public services such as education, healthcare, and security; consistent readiness to defend the independence, territorial integrity, and Muslims’ dignity; annihilating the groups who aim to damage the society; fair distribution of national wealth, etc. In this way, Imam (PBUH) presented a general picture of the ideal society (Akhavan Mofrad, 2006: 54-5).”

1.2.3. **Formulating a Strategy for transition from status quo to the ideal conditions**

Imam’s choice of the methods of resistance was quite precise. Such was his astuteness that, in each stage of the revolution, had he chosen any other tactic but the one he did,

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\(^5\) charged interest
the victory of the Islamic revolution would not have been achieved as quickly as it did (Malakoutian, 2010: 296). The strategies favored by Imam Khomeini (PBUH) as extracted from his speeches may be outlined as follows:

- **Individual growth**: In Imam’s view, the precondition of any revolutionary act is proper self-improvement and spiritual purification on the individual level.
- **Passive disobedience**: Imam called on religious scholars to sever their ties with the Shah’s regime.
- **Campaigning and education**: Imam Khomeini (PBUH) put great emphasis on the necessity of these two factors in preparation of better conditions within which revolutionary transformations could occur; statements, speeches and books, in addition to expressing popular discontent through demonstrations and strikes are some of the required actions.
- **Establishing new institutions**: Imam believed in the establishment of new political, social and cultural institutions.
- **Long-term plans**: Imam warned the revolutionaries against ignorance and impatience and advised them that instead of being overeager to see the result of their actions, engage in ‘revolutionary patience.’
- **Military resistance and Jihad**: Imam Khomeini (PBUH) deemed military conflict with the oppressors as the last resort in any situation which, in any event, may be considered an inevitable consequence of all revolutions (Ibid: 56)

**Comparison of the Ideology of the Oil Nationalization Movement with That of the Islamic Revolution**

**A. Similarities**

a. The leaders of the Oil Nationalization Movement relied on ‘Anti-imperialist Nationalism’ and adopted anti-colonial policies in their efforts; both hallmarks of all movements taking shape in third-world counties at that point in history. They also strived to rid the country of any sort of despotism and absolute power for one. In the Islamic Revolution, too, anti-colonial policies and elimination of the monarchical system were central in the vision of Imam Khomeini (PBUH).

b. While the ideology of Islamic Revolution was in development, attaining freedom, independence and justice were principles Imam Khomeini invariably insisted upon. These were equally underlined by the religious and nationalist leaders of the Oil Nationalization Movement as the foundation of their ideology.

**B. Differences**
a. The nationalist ideology of the Oil Nationalization Movement was a borrowed entity whose dependence on its foreign versions had made it fundamentally incompatible with the spirit of Iranian society who put their religion before everything else. Consequently, the proponents of this ideology were unable to really understand the people’s demands; all that was seen during the movement in the way of mobilization was due to the presence of influential clerics, namely Ayatollah Kashani, who gave a religious direction to nationalist slogans. Conversely, the Shiite ideology of the Islamic Revolution originated in the very heart of the Iranian society and its individual and social plans were in accordance with the people’s beliefs; therefore, it attracted the sympathy of the majority effortlessly and made its way deep into their hearts.

b. The goal of both the nationalist and religious leaders of the Oil Nationalization Movement was to block the British’s access to Iran’s oil reserves through nationalization thereof, but Imam Khomeini’s ideology demanded nothing short of total eradication of colonization from the country.

c. The nationalist and religious leaders of the Oil Nationalization Movement only meant to eliminate absolute authoritarianism and to replace it with constitutional monarchy or parliamentary democracy, while the Islam Imam Khomeini (PBUH) had in mind could never possibly accept the continuation of the monarchical system. Therefore, the overthrowing of Shah’s regime was immediately followed by the establishment of the Islamic state by Imam Khomeini.

d. The ideology promoted by the leaders of the Oil Nationalization Movement i.e. nationalism, was only effective in the fight against foreign imperialism, but when it came to governing the society and regulating social relations, it was simply devoid of the required system of thought and intellectual fortitude; even the movement’s religious leaders had not proposed any practical guidelines for the administration of the society in the aftermath of their possible success, and all they could say about the ideal conditions they sought was a nationalized oil industry. On the other hand, there is the Islamic revolution which was ‘A Prelude to the Constitution and Islamic Government of Iran’ which distinguished it from other similar movements.

e. The intellectual leaders of the Oil Nationalization Movement were not ‘Marja’s and this was justifiable due to their nationalist ideology. Even the religious leaders of this movement were not among the Maraji’. Contrastingly, Imam Khomeini (PBUH), the intellectual leader of the Islamic Revolution, had long been a Marja’ and was the foremost religious authority in the Shia world; a decisive attribute which influenced the public’s acceptance of the ideology of the revolution.

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6 Literally ‘religious authority;’ a Grand Ayatollah with the authority to make legal decisions within the confines of Islamic law for followers and less-credentialed clerics.
2. Functions of Mobilizing Leaders’ Revolutionary Mobilization in the Oil Nationalization Movement and Islamic Revolution

Mobilizing leaders are equipped with the ability to incite the people toward revolutionary action and rhetoric is their most potent weapon (Bashirieh, 2014: 92). This function was performed across three stages of launching the movement, overthrowing the ruling regime, and establishing the new state, through the course of the Oil Nationalization Movement and Islamic Revolution led by top Shiite clerics Ayatollah Kashani and Imam Khomeini (PBUH) respectively.

2.1. Function of Mobilizing Leaders’ Revolutionary Mobilization in the Oil Nationalization Movement

Among the Shiite faqihs and clerics of the time, Ayatollah Kashani is known to have been the most active. Making effective use of the status and influence of Shiite leaders among Iranians which has been unchanging throughout history, Kashani assumed the leadership of the movement, and guided and encouraged the people excellently throughout their protests and battles (Aboutalebi, 2012: 7).

2.1.1. Launching the movement

In this section we examine the messages communicated by Ayatollah Kashani to the people and their influence in mobilizing the protestors and launching the movement.

2.1.1.1. The Mobilizing role of Ayatollah Kashani in the collapse and assassination of Hazhir

Ayatollah Kashani had opposed all the post-25 Shahrivar 1320 governments and unsettled them with his trenchant, revelatory speeches and the demonstrations he organized. Kashani also led the people’s protests against Abdolhossein Hazhir in the late 1940s. In June 1948, Kashani organized a demonstration against Hazhir’s appointment as Prime Minister, a number of devout protestors were killed and wounded, however this laid the foundation of Hazhir’s rapid downfall and paved the way for his assassination (Ibid: 71). Hazhir’s assassination was carried out at roughly the same time as the rigged parliamentary election of 1949 by a member of Islamist group ‘Fada'iyan-e Islam’ which, at this point, was strongly affiliated with Ayatollah Kashani. Following this assassination, the government was forced to annul the election and, eventually, Mosaddegh, Kashani and six other figures who had taken refuge in the Shah’s court made it into the parliament (Rahdar, 2009: 51).

2.1.1.2. The mobilizing role of Ayatollah Kashani in discrediting the Gass-Golshayan Agreement

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7 scholars
8 16 September 1941, the date on which Mohammad Reza Pahlavi succeeded his father, Reza, as the king (Shah) of Iran.
9 English: ‘Self-sacrificers of Islam’
Ayatollah Kashani played a decisive part in discrediting the Gass-Golshayan deal. Of the evidence indicating Kashani’s central role in this issue may be Mosaddegh’s decision, in a pre-agenda speech delivered prior to a 16th parliament session said to be exclusively held to finalize the Gass-Golshayan supplementary bill, to read a message from Ayatollah Kashani as the most influential figure within the cleric community, with the purpose of enfeebling the support of the supplementary bill in the parliament:

> When the issue of Oil was raised, I considered it my religious and national duty to pronounce the opinion of the Iranian nation as to the injustice committed by the oil company and the grossly violated rights of Iranians, in the form of an official declaration and to soberly demand that their pillaged property be returned to them... Iran’s Oil belongs to the nation... a legal contract that is imposed and forcibly signed is legally null and void and cannot deprive the Iranian nation from their clear, inalienable rights (Hoseinian, 2006: 89).

Eventually, Ayatollah Kashani’s efforts came to fruition. On 10 December 1950, the parliament voted in favor of the report which suggested the Iranians’ rights were not properly protected within the agreement and consequently withdrawn from the parliament.

2.1.1.3. **Ayatollah Kashani and the gatherings in Shah mosque (22 and 26 December)**

Through a public announcement, Kashani called on the people to gather in the Shah mosque on 22 December 1950 to demand the nationalization of Iran’s oil industry: “To get our oil back from the enemies of religion and the country, and express our wish to nationalize the oil industry, let us gather in the Shah mosque on 1 Dey [22 December], at 3 p.m. (Ibid).” Kashani later released another announcement, asking the people to continue their demonstrations by gathering in the Shah mosque on 6 Bahman (26 January) again. In this statement, Kashani made it clear that uprooting all the religious and worldly corruptions plaguing the nation would only be possible if the British’s dominance over the country’s oil were to be ended and the oil industry nationalized.

2.1.1.4. **Ayatollah Kashani’s announcement and the Baharestan square demonstration**

In order to keep the struggle going and reinvigorate the movement’s fighting spirit, Kashani once again called on the people to gather, this time, in Baharestan square, on 8 Dey (29 December). Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, the prominent Egyptian journalist, describes this stupendous day as follows:

> Ayatollah Kashani’s voice is echoing all around the globe: “Get out of our country now, you English dogs! Leave our oil alone!” Torrents of crowd, chanting to the top of their voices, were on their way to the parliament building on the streets leading to Baharestan square. When the people arrived in front of the building, however, the police forces stationed in and on top of the parliament building suddenly stood down; a new order had arrived directly from the Marble Palace: “Do not resist against Ayatollah” (Ibid: 91).
At this point, Ayatollah Kashani knew the nationalization of oil industry was almost accomplished, and determined to mobilize the people and force the state institutions to make, and announce, their decision immediately.

2.1.1.5. Ayatollah Kashani’s mobilizing role in opposing and assassination of Razmara
Following Mansour’s resignation and Razmara’s appointment as Prime Minister, Kashani’s house became the center of the battle against Razmara. According to a special Shahrbani report, “Mr. Kashani is making a most aggressive effort to shape the public opinion through a network of preachers and prayer-leaders in order to prepare the people and Bazar’s businessmen to oppose Lieutenant General Razmara’s government.” Ayatollah Kashani rejected the British envoy’s request to reach a compromise with Razmara’s government, and proceeded to release another cautionary statement on the day immediately following Razmara’s appointment (Aboutalebi, 2012: 72). Kashani advised the parliament against trusting Razmara, saying: “I had warned the heads of affairs and members of the National Consultative Assembly [parliament] against such governments coming to power. Unfortunately, however, today I see that they intend to leave the country in the clutches of dictatorship once again (Hoseinian, 2006: 92).”

In spite of all the protests, Razmara did assume the Prime Minister’s seat. He submitted the Gass-Golshayan bill to the 16th parliament (Rahdar, 2009: 52). The government’s support of the Gass-Golshayan agreement led to a meeting between Fadayian-e Islam and the National Front at the request of the former, where Fadayian-e Islam pledged to assassinate Razmara and, in return, the National Front promised to make sure Islamic injunctions were properly implemented if they came into power. In the end, Razmara’s assassination was indeed carried out by Fadayian operative, Khalil Tahmasebi (Aboutalebi, 2012: 72). Fadayian-e Islam and the Society of Muslim Warriors were two Islamist organizations who had pledged allegiance to the leadership of Ayatollah Kashani (Madani, 2006: 23).

2.1.2. Overthrowing the ruling regime
With the tireless efforts of the National Front (supported unconditionally by Ayatollah Kashani) which were complemented by the elimination of Razmara and Ayatollah Kashani’s historic interview, the Oil Nationalization Bill was quickly approved in the oil commission and, finally, passed by the National Consultative Assembly as law on 29 Esfand 1329 (21 March 1951); thereby neutralizing Shah and the colonizers’ plans to renew the exclusive contract with the APOC11. The Iranians’ courageous struggles, which had been started and brilliantly led by selfless religious and nationalist leaders, concluded in complete success. This fateful day was named the ‘National Oil Nationalization Day’ and its anniversary has

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10 the law enforcement force
11 Anglo-Persian Oil Company
since been celebrated as a national holiday (A group of supporters of the Islamic Movement in Iran and Europe, 1979: 18).

Here, an excerpt from Ayatollah Kashani’s historic interview with the Daily Express journalist, Sefton Delmer, which acted as a virtual catalyst in the eventual victory of the movement. After asking several questions regarding the Oil Nationalization Movement, Delmer asked Kashani about the assassination of Razmara: “What is your excellency’s judgment as to what was done to Prime Minister Razmara, and the bullet that killed him?” To which Ayatollah answered: “It was in the interest of the Iranian Nation, and the aforesaid bullet dealt the greatest, most decisive blow to the body of colonists and the enemies of Iranians” (A group of supporters of the Islamic Movement in Iran and Europe, 1979: 105-11).

2.1.3. Establishing the new state

During the period when the minority group led by Ayatollah Kashani were at peak power in the 16th parliament following the assassination of Razmara – which had been openly supported by Ayatollah Kashani – there was an atmosphere of genuine terror for the country’s ruling group: the people were completely mobilized and on the move, and no high-ranking figure within the administration dared accept the position of Prime Minister without Kashani’s consent (Aboutalebi, 2012: 72). On one of these days, Jamal Emamim, who was almost certain Mosaddegh would not accept, asked the latter to take control of the government. Meanwhile, Kashani, who had been informed the British were poised to have Seyyed Zia12 back in the Prime Minister’s seat again, warned the latter with his signature forthrightness against accepting this shameful assignment over a phone call. However, Kashani managed to convince Mosaddegh, who had certain doubts about whether to accept the proposal, to take on the position. In the end, the new government formally took office in May 1951. Mosaddegh had accepted to head the government on the condition that his nine-article bill should immediately be passed into law (Chegini, 2010: 233).

2.2. Mobilization in the course of the Islamic Revolution

Based on Eric Hoffer’s theory, there are three stashes to the mobilization of revolutionary forces, all of which are manifest in the leadership of Imam Khomini (PBUH). Imam began the first stage – launching the movement – between 1962 and 1964 by exposing the Shah’s regime’s wrongdoings to unite the society behind himself. The second stage – that is, overthrowing the ruling regime – was at its height between 1977 and 1979, at the end of which Imam’s mobilizing efforts culminated in the collapse of Shah’s regime. The third stage – establishing the new state – occurred immediately after the second, and the Islamic Republic was announced following the victory of the Islamic Revolution. e excellently throughout their protests and battles (Aboutalebi, 2012: 7).

2.2.1. Launching the movement

12 Seyyed Zia’eddin Tabatabaei
In this section, we examine Imam Khomeini’s efforts between 1962 and 1964 which resulted in the launch of the movement.

2.2.1.1. Imam exposes the truth about the Bill on Local Councils
Following Asadollah Alam’s appointment as Prime Minister, in October 1962 the Bill on Local Councils was approved by the parliament against the constitutional constitution and announced through the press during the long hiatus of the National Consultative Assembly. This decision, devised to consciously eliminate Islam from state affairs, was vehemently opposed by Imam Khomeini (Nasri, 2008: 91-2). Imam’s struggle to have this bill repealed is a typical example of his perseverance toward worthy goals. As the news of the bill’s passage into law spread, the clerics’ protests were invigorated by a telegram from Imam (PBUH). Imam had addressed Alam in the telegram, declaring: “During the Assembly’s lengthy hiatus, the government has been engaged in making decisions which are in direct contrast with the holy faith and clear violations of the constitution. Rest assured that any deviations from Islamic injunctions and the laws passed by the National Consultative Assembly shall result in grave consequences for you personally, as well as for your government, before the all-powerful, all-dominant Presence of God, the Muslim nation, and the law (Nejati, 1994: 223).”

2.2.1.2. Imam exposes the truth about Shah’s White Revolution
With the repeal of the Bill on Local Councils, Shah attempted to enforce another set of American-inspired reforms; this time, he announced his intention to hold a referendum to acquire the people’s approval on his proposed reforms. Imam Khomeini released a public statement in return, declaring the referendum against the law and his intention to boycott it: “There is no mention of referendum in the Iranian constitution and, barring one instance when it was proposed by those illegally in charge, this is unprecedented (Ibid: 224).” Imam (PBUH) did not stop at mere protesting against the referendum, but also attacked Shah personally (Ibid: 218). e of God, the Muslim nation, and the law (Nejati, 1994: 223).”

2.2.1.3. Imam’s revelations on the eve of 1342 (March 1963)
With the 1342 Eid of Nowruz13 days away, upon Imam Khomeini’s suggestion, a statement titled “The Clergy Shall Have no Eid This Year” was released and public mourning was announced. In this statement, Imam (PBUH) revealed some of the Pahlavi regime’s dangerous conspiracies against Islam. The regime’s agents raided the Feyzieh Seminary in retaliation, killing a number of seminarians and ordinary people in the process. These developments intensified the growing discontent with Shah’s regime even further (Nasri, 2008: 95). Imam Khomeini sent another telegram to Tehran’s Shiite scholars, describing the assault on Feyzieh and launching a scathing attack against Shah:

The assault on the Feyzieh Seminary, the hub of Shiite clergy, by commandos and police forces disguised in urban clothes was reminiscent of the Mongols’

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13 New year’s holiday and celebrations
invasion of Iran... These people disrespect our religious sanctities while singing Shah’s praises. Favoring Shah means pillage, dishonoring of Islam, violating the Muslims’ rights... in the name of the nation, I hereby interpellate the Prime Minister, Mr. Alam. I have already prepared my heart for the bayonets of your agents (Nejati, 1994: 226).

2.2.1.4. Imam’s revelations in Muharram of 1342 (May 1963)

With Muharram close, Imam Khomeini (PBUH) called on other clerics to expose the Pahlavi regime’s crimes to the public. Savak released a notification in this regard, instructing all clerics to: 1. Not speak against the commander in chief (Shah), 2. Not speak against Israel, and 3. Stop insisting that ‘Islam is in danger’ (Nasri, 2008: 95-6). To this, however, Imam Khomeini responded with a statement of his own, encouraging his peers to not be intimidated by the threats of Savak and to keep raising awareness about the danger posed by Israel and its agents in Iran:

...Fulfill your religious obligation and draw inspiration from the Master of the Oppressed who sacrificed his very life to revive the Sharia. Be not afraid of a few days of arrest and torture. Your excellencies should be well aware that the danger threatening Islam today is no less than that posed by Banu Umayya. This tyrant regime is in full cooperation with Israel and is agents... Raise awareness among the people about the danger of Israel and its agents. To remain silent these days is to approve this oppressive regime and is the same as assisting the enemy... (Nejati, 1994: 226-7)

2.2.1.5. Imam Khomeini’s speech on 13 Khordad 1342 (3 June 1963) and the Demonstrations of 15 Khordad

In the afternoon of 13 Khordad, Imam Khomeini (PBUH) delivered his historic speech (Nasri, 2008: 96). In terms of significance, this speech was indeed a turning point in the sociopolitical history of Iran, and generated astonishing developments in the years to come (Nejati, 1994: 228). The speech, delivered in uncommonly simple language, marked the first time that Shah, the king of Iran, was openly attacked by a cleric. In the presence of tens of thousands of audience members, Imam Khomeini described Shah with such belittling terms as “Mr. Shah,” “[singular] you,” “wretched,” and “miserable.” The speech shook the foundations of the regime and virtually started the countdown for its downfall (Ibid, 233).

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14 Better known as the ‘Mongol conquest of Khwarezmia’ led by Genghis Khan.
15 The first month of the Islamic calendar, Muharram is a month of remembrance and mourning for Shiites due to its being synonymous with Ashura, the tenth day of the month, on which Imam Hussein ibn Ali was martyred.
16 Persian abbreviation for ‘Organization of Intelligence and National Security,’ was the secret police, domestic security and intelligence service established by Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
17 English for ‘Sayyid al Mazloomin,’ one of Imam Hussein’s titles.
18 Islamic canonical law
19 A clan of the Quraysh tribe famous in the early Islam history. The clan is supremely hated in Shiite Islam due to their martyring of the first three Shiite Imams: Ali, and his two sons Hassan and Hussein (whose mother, Fatimah, was daughter of Prophet Muhammad)
True to form, Shah resorted to violence at the first sign of trouble, and issued an order for Imam’s arrest. Imam Khomeini’s apprehension gave rise to the bloody uprising of 15 Khordad (5 June 1963) and the people’s hostility toward the regime was only intensified (Nasri, 2008: 96).

2.2.1.6. **Imam’s revelations about the Vienna Convention**

During Hasan Ali Mansur’s term as Prime Minister, on 13 October 1964, Iran’s membership in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was approved by the rubber-stamp National Consultative Assembly. According to the provisions of this bill, in addition to political diplomats, all the other American advisors were granted diplomatic immunity, thereby trampling Iranians’ national dignity. In his 26 October 1964 anti-Shah speech, Imam Khomeini (PBUH) identified the ‘capitulation law’ as a disgrace to the honor and national pride of Iranians. Following this speech, Imam was immediately arrested and sent on exile to Turkey, and later to Najaf, Iraq (Ibid: 96-7).

2.3. **Overthrow of the ruling regime by the Islamic Revolution of Iran**

This section deals with the most decisive events regarding the peaking of Imam Khomeini’s movement in its final two years (1977-79) which culminated in the overthrow of Shah’s regime.

2.3.1. **The passing of Mostafa Khomeini, Imam Khomeini’s speech in Najaf, and the people’s demonstrations**

Haj Agha Mostafa, Imam’s eldest son, was martyred in a mysterious incident on 23 October 1977 in Najaf. Imam Khomeini (PBUH) identified his son’s martyrdom as “one of those inscrutable divine blessings.” The suspected murder of the movement’s leader was ensued by the people’s angry reaction who, without exception, pointed to Savak as the perpetrator. What bothered Shah the most, however, was Imam Khomeini himself, whose speech in Najaf on the occasion of his son’s death was being widely distributed in Iran in the form of cassette tapes (Aqdasi, 2014: 54-5). All these signs of popular discontent were enough for Shah, who was now being backed by the American government, to escalate the fight against his nemesis. The outcome of this decision triggered reactions that resembled a vast explosion (Ibid: 55).

2.3.2. **Imam Khomeini’s statements after the events of 9 January 1978 in Qom**

Following Jimmy Carter’s visit to Tehran, Ettela’at newspaper published an offensive article about Imam (PBUH), the foremost Marja in the Shiite world, which caused the movement he had started to reach new heights (Aqdasi, 2014: 53). The day after its publication, the article triggered furious protests in Qom. On 11 January, the bazaar of Qom was closed and classes in the Feyzieh Seminary were canceled; the seminarians and bazaar tradesmen both participated in the ensuing demonstrations. The police attempted to disperse the angry

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20 Titled “Iran and Red and Black Colonization”
masses with a number of shots in the air, but then proceeded to open fire at the crowd itself (Nejati, 1994: 67). Upon learning of the regime’s violent response, Imam Khomeini issued a message, in which the events of 11 January were described as “a great tragedy” and interpreted the suppression of the uprising as a clear sign of the regime’s desperation and that the revolution was close (Aqdasi, 2012: 67-8). The most striking difference between these events and the previous ones was that it was the first time the regime had disrespected a Shiite Marja and scholar with such insolence. Furthermore, the uprising was distinctive in terms of Imam Khomeini’s leadership, as he managed to introduce a definitive method of battle against the regime: peaceful resistance, which painted a positive image of the Islamic government Imam would soon found.

2.3.3. The Chehelom\textsuperscript{21} commemoration of Qom martyrs in Tabriz and Imam’s statements
In the aftermath of the 9 January events of Qom and in spite of the regime’s efforts to cover up the impact thereof, the people and clergy made cassette copies of Imam Khomeini’s messages and widely distributed them to raise more awareness. In these statements, Imam (PBUH) encouraged the people to keep up the resistance, and on 18 February, forty days after the deaths in Qom, he issued a new statement aimed to expose the crimes of the so-called claimants of human rights:

\begin{quote}
It has been forty days since the death of our youth... the people, with the sort of bravery that was perhaps unprecedented in history, stood against this government and Shah’s minions with empty hands, fought, and suffered casualties... all the agonies and miseries we are going through and will go through in the future are caused by the leaders of the very countries who have signed this ‘Declaration of Human Rights’... (Sahifeh-ye Imam: 22-3)
\end{quote}

As a result of the distribution of such statements, the Chehelom memorial service of the martyrs was held in numerous mosques across the country, and in particular, the people’s gathering for prayer in the mosque turned onto a full-on demonstration in Tabriz. As the crowd and protests grew, the army blocked the street with tanks and opened fire on the people, injuring and killing many (Nejati 1994: 1994). The ruthless massacres of Qom and Tabriz gave a new meaning to the culture of martyrdom and righteous struggle, which was precisely what Imam (PBUH) wanted (Aqdasi, 2012: 75-6). Therefore, the long-standing tradition of the fortieth day commemorations, which was blessed with fresh significance due to Imam Khomeini’s awakening messages, had rattled Shah’s royal palaces with alarming vehemence (Ibid: 86).

2.3.4. Imam Khomeini’s revelations about the government of Sharif-Emami and the events of 17 Shahrivar\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{21} In Shi’ite tradition, a memorial (referred to as Chehelom in Persian) is held forty days after a person’s death. \\
\textsuperscript{22} 8 September 1978, also known as ‘the Black Friday.’
\end{flushright}
With the nation’s discontent increasingly growing and Shah’s confidence diminishing, Sharif-Emami was appointed Prime Minister on 27 August 1978 (Nejati, 1994: 80-1). He named his cabinet as the ‘Government of National Reconciliation’ and aimed to alleviate some of the accumulated tension in the society with his deceitful policies (Aqdasi, 2012: 102). Imam, however, who was vigilantly monitoring the political developments of the country, neutralized this latest trick as well by sending a message to the nation:

...Shah’s replacing of one agent [Amoozegar] with another [Sharif-Emami] who has started off with clear deceit and trickery, is only a conspiracy against the nation to break down the Islamic movement and to waste the blood of Islam’s dear young people. For the past fifteen years, and especially the last few months, Shah’s henchmen have been leaving one black mark after another on history with their massacres and other crimes. Now that it has been proven that guns, tanks, and threats are useless against this rising nation, they have resorted to evil deceits and aim to maintain their criminal ways by cunningly tempting promises... (Aqdasi, 2012: 105-14).

Imam’s exposing of Sharif-Emami’s evil designs served to intensify mass protests all over the country. With the arrival of Eid al-Fitr\(^\text{23}\) Sharif-Emami found himself up against a series of demonstration which did not stop until the government declared martial law for six months on 8 September 1978. A large number of people, however, who gathered in Zhaleh square as per the rendezvous agreed two days earlier, ignored the new ruling and warnings of military commanders, thus the latter ordered gunmen to open fire, resulting in the death or injury of many (Ibid). The following day, Imam Khomeini (PBUH) issued a message, calling on the nation to maintain their unity in the face of the regime’s pressure, and ignore the martial law: “Rest assured, Iranians, that victory shall sooner or later be yours. Shah intended to implicate the venerable Iranian clergy and politicians in his massacres through the so-called reconciliation government, but his deceitful scheme was uncovered quickly (Ibid).” Furthermore, emphasizing the importance of the people’s continued resistance, Imam called on military members to join the masses in the fight (Ibid, 114).

Following these events, Shah desperately kept trying to allay the irrepresible volcano of popular fury by changing of Prime Ministers. After Sharif-Emami’s failure, Shah sought to save himself with the help of General Gholam Ali Az’hari, who was immediately followed by Shapoor Bakhtiar, both of whom failed to do anything in the way of calming the nation down and arguably intensified the protests (Nasri, 2008: 99). Meanwhile, under pressure from the Ba’ath regime of Iraq, Imam Khomeini (PBUH) had to leave Najaf, first for Kwait, and from there to France, where he would spend the last six month in Neauphle-le-Château, a village near Paris. Imam continued to demand Shah’s departure from the country and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, until Shah gave up and, having done his utmost

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\(^{23}\) ‘Festival of breaking the fast’ is an important religious holiday celebrated by Muslims worldwide that marks the end of Ramadan, the Islamic holy month of fasting.
to save his falling throne, escaped the country on 16 January 1979. Imam Khomeini, in turn, returned to Iran after fourteen years in exile on 1 February 1979 (Ibid: 100). Shah’s escape and Imam’s entrance finally marked the end of Pahlavi Dynasty and the advent of the Islamic republic.

2.3.5. Establishing the new state
In the ten-day window between Imam’s return and the announcement of the Islamic Republic’s establishment, Bakhtiar and his supporters – such as the U.S.A. – made great efforts to keep him in power through questioning the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran government, to no avail. Imam insisted on Bakhtiar’s ousting: “Bakhtiar has to go because his prime ministry’s decree has been signed by Shah. The Regency Council24 is also illegal. The only solution is the appointment of an interim minister to oversee the referendum. The army, too, must step aside itself (Nasri, 2008: 99-100).”

Four days after his return to Iran, Imam Khomeini appointed Mehdi Bazargan as Prime Minister. On 11 February, the government declared martial law from 4 p.m. onward. Imam Khomeini again called on everyone to ignore the government’s order, and the people flooded the streets. The same night, Homafaran25 engaged in conflict with the Imperial Guard in the Doshan Tappeh Air Base. The day after, the army announced its neutrality and many police stations and military bases were seized by the people, and Bakhtiar’s 37-day government collapsed (Nejati, 1994: 367). Following the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the end of monarchy, the holy state of the Islamic Republic of Iran was formed based on Imam Khomeini’s fiqhy theory (Shiroudi, 2005: 90).

Comparison of Mobilization in the Oil Nationalization Movement and the Islamic Revolution

A. Similarities

a. The religious nature of the society and the masses has always enabled the Shiite clergy to communicate easily with the people and guide them in the intended direction. In light of this characteristic of the Iranian society, clerics have always politically mobilized the nation.

b. In both movements, the coalition of clerics, modern intellectuals, and bazaar tradespeople was the key to success.

B. Differences

24 A nine-member body formed on 13 January 1979 by Mohammad Reza Shah to carry out his duties in his absence.
25 The imperial Airforce
a. One of the distinctive differences between the mobilizing leaders of the movements may be found in their respective domestic policies. Ayatollah Kashani, as a mobilizing leader, only considered the government to be responsible for all the trouble; his messages and announcements mobilized the people only against the reigning government, as the national movement he led sought to instill constitutional governance within the law, and never meant to threaten the court or Shah himself. Contrastingly, Imam questioned the very basis of the Pahlavi Dynasty and made sure to Expose Shah’s true identity as the protector of the interests of the global arrogance and the West through all his speeches and statements.

b. The other difference is in foreign policies of the two movements. Ayatollah Kashani’s only stated intention in his announcements was the elimination of Britain’s colonial dominance and blocking their access to Iran’s oil reserves, while Imam Khomeini (PBUH) expanded his targets to include the U.S., Israel, the West and the East and strived to constantly remind the people of this and mobilize them in the struggle toward independence.

c. Imam Khomeini started his revolutionary movement without using any of the prevalent methods such as founding a party or a newspaper, or resorting to armed revolt; instead, depending solely on the unlimited Divine power and the people’s willingness to participate, Imam managed to motivate the people through religious beliefs and guide them to the ultimate victory of the Islamic Revolution. Ayatollah Kashani’s national movement, on the other hand, initially engaged in conventional political activism such as working within a party to nationalize the country’s oil and end the British colonization of Iran, but never shied away from turning to such violent methods as intimidation and encouraging assassination.

d. Finally, the mobilizing leadership of the Islamic revolution prioritized the spiritual aspect of the fight over the political one, while the Oil Nationalization Movement put the emphasis mainly on politics. Imam Khomeini’s criticism of Ayatollah Kashani is due to this very point; although Kashani sincerely strived to work in the interest of Islam, he always depended on politics more than on the power of religion, and his efforts strike one mostly as parliamentary battles. Imam Khomeini believed the Islamic Revolution movement to be religious in all aspects, with politics only finding meaning if employed in this context. Therefore, throughout the course of the movement, Imam openly informed the people of the developments related to the revolution and refused to discuss any issues in private meetings only.

3. State-Building Methods in the Oil Nationalization Movement and the Islamic Revolution

3.1. State-building in the Oil Nationalization Movement

At this point, we may look at the leadership of the movement during the first and second terms of the nationalist government:
3.1.1. The first term of the nationalist government (May 1951 – July 1952)
During this term, Mosaddegh’s efforts as the manager of the movement, and the role of Ayatollah Kashani’s support in establishing the former’s power is examined. In truth, Doctor Mosaddegh’s goal before assuming the Prime Minister’s seat was to achieve the Oil Nationalization Act and complete dispossession of Iranian properties from the colonizing British company.

3.1.1.1. Implementation of the Oil Nationalization Act and dispossession of Britain
On 3 May 1951, in addition to introducing his cabinet to the parliament, Dr. Mosaddegh announced one of his most important plans involving the nationalization of oil industry all over the country (Katouzian, 1992: 182). Eventually, the bill was passed as a nine-clause act in the parliament and signed by Shah, and brought Mosaddegh to direct confrontation with the British government (Chegini, 2010: 234). Dr. Mosaddegh believed that in order to nullify the British’s provocative efforts, a law should be passed to completely dispossess them of anything Iranian. To this end, after the election of the new ‘mixed board of directors’ by the parliament, the government pronounced the dissolution of the APOC and the interim board of directors, along with a number of members from the mixed board, set out for Abadan. With the dissolution of the information office of the former company, the board members mounted the new company’s panel which read ‘The Iranian Oil Company,’ and informed all petroleum buyers that their receipts were still valid and that they could receive their purchases by presenting their receipts. The heads of the old company acted to oppose this, and instructed all the petroleum tankers who got their cargo from the APOC to refuse to cooperate with the newly-founded NIOC. On 29 June 1951, Mosaddegh’s government notified the APOC staff that they would be working for the NIOC from then on. Eventually, with the dismissal of a former director from the old company, Iran’s oil was finally in control of the Iranian delegate (Ibid, 235). Thus, the dispossession of the British was effectively finalized on 20 June, a move that was meant to let the British company know there would be no hesitation in Iran’s determination to implement the Oil Nationalization Act (Shervin, 1995: 17).

3.1.1.2. The role of Ayatollah Kashani’s support of Mosaddegh’s efforts and the uprising of 30 Tir (22 July 1952)
Mosaddegh’s government faced numerous problems during this period. Ayatollah Kashani’s solid support gave a popular and religious air to Mosaddegh’s efforts, and from the very beginning, proved his intention to help Mosaddegh deal with difficulties and overcome the domestic and foreign obstructionism, by staging many gatherings and delivering rousing speeches. When Britain threatened Mosaddegh with military intervention, Kashani was quick to respond: “If this indeed happens, I will issue an order for jihad.” Later, when the NIOC staff had gone on a strike upon provocation by the Tudeh Party, Ayatollah Kashani called on those on strike to unite with the government. When Mosaddegh attempted to allay his government’s financial shortcomings by issuing national
bonds, Ayatollah Kashani declared assisting the government as a religious duty to Iranians (Khalilian, 1993: 61-2).

After the elections for 17th term of the National Consultative Assembly were held, Mosaddegh requested that Shah recognize the Prime Minister’s constitutional prerogative to name a Minister of War. Shah’s refusal to grant this request convinced Mosaddegh to submit his resignation on 17 July 1952. Consequently, the representatives close to Shah in the parliament voted for Ahmad Qavam’s appointment as the new Prime Minister in the absence of the National Front representatives, and Shah issued the decree to Qavam’s appointment (Tehrani, 2014: 35). Upon Ayatollah Kashani’s and the National Movement’s opposition against these developments, Tehran plunged into demonstration and unrest. The day after Mosaddegh’s resignation, Ayatollah Kashani released a firm, strongly-worded, statement in support of Mosaddegh, addressing the nation as follows:

Ahmad Qavam must know that in this land, where the distressed people have finally managed to break free of the [British] dictatorship, one cannot let the suppression of thought and belief the order of the day or threaten the people with mass execution. I shall be clear: it is the duty of all Muslim brothers to participate in this Greater Jihad and, once and for all, prove to those who still fancy colonial policies that going back to the dominance they once held over this nation is absolutely impossible (A group of supporters of the Islamic Movement in Iran and Europe, 1979: 26).

Even when Ali Amini went to Kashani’s house to discuss an offer to introduce only ministers whom are approved by Kashani, the latter insisted, “As long as Dr. Mosaddegh is there, no one else deserves to be Prime Minister (Khalilian, 1992: 62).” Eventually, the people heeded the call of their religious and political leaders, came to the streets in masses, and fearlessly faced the bullets of Shah’s troops with empty hands. Mosaddegh was reinstated as Prime Minister with the support of Kashani, and this time, Shah also granted him full control of the military (A group of supporters of the Islamic Movement in Iran and Europe, 1979: 27-8). The events of 30 Tir was the summit of Oil Nationalization Movement, and the high point of Ayatollah Kashani and Dr. Mosaddegh’s cooperation. Indeed, from the moment the Muslim Nation of Iran achieved its victory in having the Oil Nationalization passed into law by their National Consultative Assembly, Dr. Mosaddegh’s only pillar of strength was the nation who were in a state of constant mobilization thanks to Ayatollah Kashani’s influence.

3.1.2. The second term of the nationalist government (July 1952 – August 1953)
Dr. Mosaddegh retained his stance in foreign policies during his second term. He was distrustful of the British and believed that they sought to keep a stranglehold on all Iranian institutions by controlling the oil. This conflict manifested itself in the severance of diplomatic ties (Bozorgmehr, 1988: 199-200).
In terms of domestic policies, however, Dr. Mosaddegh started off by introducing his new cabinet as well as his nine-clause reform plan to the National Consultative Assembly (Tehrani, 2014: 37). Making full use of his enhanced authority, Mosaddegh enacted a number of reforms, chief among them being an austerity program called ‘Oil-less Economy,’ which was developed after oil negotiations came to a cul de sac and hopes for assistance from the United States diminished. In general, despite the fierce pressure applied on the government, Mosaddegh’s second term was associated with remarkable achievements: for instance, various programs were devised to modernize agriculture, new factories were constructed and industrial production increased significantly. Yet, the difficulties were as remarkable as achievements. The revenue from oil sales was gone and the government was so financially poor it did not even have sufficient resources to deal with the daily expenses of governance. As a result, Mosaddegh’s second government was simply unable to run the country as effectively as it should have (Af rasyabi, 1986: 203). Despite all this, Dr. Mosaddegh attempted to dissolve the parliament to remove the parliamentary immunity of dissenting MPs: he claimed some MPs were consistently trying to sabotage the government’s plans. Mosaddegh submitted a bizarre referendum to voters to dissolve the National Consultative Assembly, which he won by almost unanimous voter support. As no mechanism for referendums was provisioned in the constitution, Mosaddegh’s decision to hold one proved a tactical error which paved the way for the masterminds of coup d’état to pounce sooner than expected (Khalilian, 1993: 64).

A brief survey into the thirteen months between Mosaddegh’s reappointment as Prime Minister and the 19 August 1953 coup d’état would reveal that British colonizers and their American coconspirators were right to conclude that the only way to overcome the Iranians’ national movement was to separate the people and Mosaddegh from the combatant clergy. To this end, extensive, sophisticated plans were elaborated and executed to create discord among these groups. Mosaddegh failed to correctly assess the depth of the catastrophe that would occur if he abandoned the side of his valiant ally, Ayatollah Kashani, and thought the masses would perpetually support his government, as they did in July 1952.

When Ayatollah Kashani learned of the court’s conspiracy and the coordination between Britain and the U.S. to oust the Prime Minister, he informed Mosaddegh of the imminence of a coup d’état. Instead of conducting a preventive contingency plan, however, Mosaddegh unfortunately sent the following message to Kashani in reply: "Yours truly only depends on the support of the Iranian nation. End of discussion. (A group of supporters of the Islamic Movement in Iran and Europe, 1979: 34-6)." Sixteen days after the dissolution of the parliament, however, the coup d’état was carried out as there was no longer a stronghold through which to uncover and nullify the conspiracies of enemies, leaving Shah and his supporters free to execute their plan at will (Ibid, 63). Ayatollah Kashani was against Mosaddegh’s domestic policies (Ibid, 29-30), so much so that the latter rejected the former’s request to be granted special authorities as he deemed it a
violation of the constitution, as well as against the interests of the nation and government itself (Hoseinian, 2006: 227).

3.2. **State-building in the Islamic Revolution of Iran**
The Islamic Revolution was organized by the clergy, themselves headed by Imam Khomeini (PBUH).

3.2.1. **Imam’s decree for the formation of the new government**
Imam (PBUH) returned to Iran on 1 February 1979 and went straight to Behesht-e Zahra\(^{26}\) from the airport to pay tribute to the martyrs of revolution, where he delivered a historic speech to his supporters in which he denounced Bakhtiar’s government as illegal and reiterated his general political plan of action:

> I shall slap this government in the mouth. I shall determine the government with the backing of this nation, because this nation accepts me. This gentleman [Bakhtiar] does not believe in himself, and his friends do not believe in him, either. The nation does not accept him and the army does not accept him. Only America is backing him and has ordered the army to support him. Britain has also backed him and had said that he must be supported (Nejati, 1994: 354-7).

3.2.2. **Imam’s decree for the formation of the Council of Revolution**
The Council of Revolution was formed following Imam’s arrival in Tehran as per the agreements already made in Paris (Shadloo, 2007: 43-4). Imam’s order to form the Council of Islamic Revolution read:

> In accordance with the rights conferred by the law of Islam and on the basis of the vote of confidence given me by the overwhelming majority of the Iranian people, for the sake of attaining the Islamic goals of the people, a temporary council has been appointed, to be known as the *Council of the Islamic Revolution*. It is to be composed of competent, committed, and trustworthy Muslims and to begin functioning soon... Well-defined, specific tasks have been assigned to this Council. It has been entrusted with the task of examining and studying conditions for the establishment of a transitional government and making all the necessary preliminary arrangements... (Sahifeh-ye Imam, 208)

According to this decree, the source of Revolution Council’s legitimacy originated solely in that of Imam Khomeini’s leadership (Saeli Kordedeh, 2005: 79-80). In other words, no bill or law could be passed or enacted without Imam’s consent (Ibid, 229).

3.2.3. **Imam Khomeini’s decree for the appointment of Bazargan**

\(^{26}\) The largest cemetery in Iran, located in the southern part of Tehran.
Four days after his return to Iran, Imam Khomeini issued a decree appointing Mehdi Bazargan as Prime Minister:

In order to put an end to this situation, relying on the public vote... I will appoint a government and a head of government. Form an interim government to both end all this confusion and to deal with the current issues such as the situation of the Constituent Assembly... hold the parliamentary elections as they [MPs] should appoint the legal government; and when the Constituent Assembly is established, they will submit the Islamic Revolution to referendum... We have already determined the interim government (Nejati, 1994: 359).

3.2.4. The referendum to turn the new state into an Islamic Republic

The first instance of disagreement between the interim government and the Islamic current surfaced in the course of discussing the type of the future state. The Islamic current wanted an ‘Islamic Republic State,’ members of the Freedom Movement of Iran were calling for a ‘Democratic Islamic Republic,’ leftists demanded ‘the People’s Islamic State,’ and members of the National Front, who tended to be more secular, favored the title ‘Republic of Iran’ (Shadloo, 2007: 58). In any event, Imam Khomeini delivered a speech that revealed the final decision—he supported the ‘Islamic Republic’:

As per God Almighty’s will, a referendum shall soon be held to determine the type of state. I consider it necessary to make it clear that I will vote for an ‘Islamic Republic;’ not one word less, not one word more. I expect the venerable nation of Iran to also vote for the Islamic Republic as it is the only path ahead of the Islamic Revolution. Still, those opposing this [type of state] are free to express their opinion... (Sahifeh-ye Imam, 265-6)

3.2.5. The Assembly of Experts for Constitution and the referendum

After the establishment of the central government across the country, a decision was made to form an assembly tasked with revision and final approval of the first draft of the constitution written by the interim government (Shadloo, 2007: 111). The approval of the new constitution, in which had also been inserted the principle involving the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (Velayat-e Faqih) – a position whose holder would be granted extensive authorities – was the second, and the most essential, step toward the consolidation of Islamism, as favored by the Islamic current, in the structure of the new state.

On 4 April 1979, in an effort to encourage the people to participate in the referendum, Imam Khomeini (PBUH) stated the following:

You, young people; you, men and women; by God’s will, should participate in the upcoming election to determine the Constituent Assembly — whose members will be the ones to approve the new constitution — with the same
enthusiasm you showed in voting for the Islamic Republic. You should come and seal your fate with the same love and passion, in every city and every province... May we, by God’s will, prove able to implement Islam’s program. (Sahifeh-ye Imam, 471-2)

Eventually, under the guidance of Imam (PBUH), the first constitution of the Islamic Republic was approved by the Assembly of Experts for Constitution, submitted on 2 December 1979 for referendum, and voted with an overwhelming majority of 98.2%. With the inclusion of the principle of Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, the first draft of constitution written by the interim government was effectively abandoned and the Islamic current took the first decisive step toward the establishment of what would come to be recognized as ‘the system of Guardianship of the Jurist’ (Ibid: 310).

Comparison of State-Building Methods in the Oil Nationalization Movement and the Islamic Revolution of Iran

A. Similarities

a. The victory of the Islamic Revolution would not be the ‘end’ of revolutionary circumstances; rather, they will continue with different characteristics. The first duty of a revolution’s leader post-victory is to ‘manage and take control’ of the situation; that is, he must contain the vast amount of energy released within the nation as well as any potential conflicts which may be described as only ‘natural’ so as to not let the revolution/movement to stray from the right course it has chosen. This characteristic was seen in the state-building of both Dr. Mosaddegh and that of the Islamic Revolution.

b. Another responsibility of the leader during the transition period is making a practical effort to create the ideal society and state promised before the movement’s victory. If this is neglected, the people’s belief in their leader will decrease and the revolutionary i.e. radical political attitude of the people may be exploited by rival groups and later target the current leader. This characteristic was quite evident in the unique leadership of Imam Khomeini (PBUH) during the state-building phase of early post-revolution era. It was also this very characteristic in the National Movement’s first attempt at state-building that bought about the great uprising of 30 Tir (21 July, 1952).

B. Differences

a. The definitive difference between the Oil Nationalization Movement and Islamic Revolution in terms of state-building was in the policies of their leaders. Some of Mosaddegh’s questionable moves, such as the request to be granted special authorities,
appointment of suspicious figures in sensitive positions, failure to pay proper attention to crucial religious reforms, and especially the decision to dissolve the parliament through a referendum, led to the separation of the religious current from the Movement. Conversely, Imam Khomeini’s immediate appointing of an interim Prime Minister and assigning him the responsibility of forming the new state’s institutions and organizations – such as the new political system, the Assembly of Experts for Constitution, etc. – was a brilliant act of leadership. Imam Khomeini (PBUH) later emphasized the importance of democracy and public participation once again by issuing the order for referendum. Consequently, the country’s new political system was voted by overwhelming majority, given the title of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and served as concrete proof of Imam’s leadership skills.

b. Although the Oil Nationalization Movement was initially truly popular, cared about the public opinion and depended on the companionship of Shiite clerics, gradually abandoned the side of the clergy in its second state-building phase, and so lost its public support. The movement may be diagnosed with a wrong change in direction that can be described as the ‘shift of the center of gravity from the people to political parties.’ This became obvious when the Movement’s nationalist leaders gave positions as important as ministries to figures who had stood against them in the past, and dismissed many who had supported them since the beginning (ibid: 104). In the Islamic Revolution, though, Imam (PBUH) assigned all the important responsibilities to the clergy, and this delegation of leadership only served to strengthen the public support of the Revolution.

c. In the course of state-building of the Oil Nationalization Movement, a certain transformation of the means into the end was observed; that is, the value of oil – as an excuse to dispossess foreign colonizers from exploiting Iran’s national resources and enforce the rule of law – grew so much that the Movement’s nationalist leaders ended up violating their original ideals as they tried to build their promised state. Fictitious generalizations regarding the importance of oil for the Western world, engaging in a war of attrition, and moralizing the idea of seeking the United States government’s help to maintain the Movement all caused this inauspicious transformation. Mosaddegh, in other words, resorted to impure means to achieve his pure end. On the other hand, however, Imam Khomeini made it his mission from the very beginning to purify the country of all the impure figures still keeping ties with the previous regime; an example would be his persistence upon Bakhtiar’s swift dismissal.

Conclusion

This paper made comparisons between the leadership methods of the Oil Nationalization Movement and the Islamic Republic of Iran with regards to three concepts: ideology, mobilization, and state-building.
In terms of ideology, components such as censuring the status quo, depicting the ideal conditions, and the strategy for transition from the current situation to ideal conditions were examined, drawing the conclusion that in the Oil Nationalization Movement, the nationalist, anti-imperialist ideology sought to eliminate the colonial dominance of APOC over the country’s southern oil reserves and facilities, and attaining full control of the oil through its nationalization; while in the Islamic Revolution, the emphasis was on Islam as a divine school of thought and the source based on which the ideology and strategies of the revolution were shaped.

As for mobilization, these two movements were examined in terms of three components: launching the movement, overthrowing the ruling regime, and establishing the new state. It was concluded that, due to the religious identity of the nation at the time of both movements, it was the clergy community, led by Ayatollah Kashani and Imam Khomeini (PBUH) who were in charge of political mobilizing of the people; with the difference being that the mobilization power during the Islamic Revolution was more comprehensive and lasting than the one seen during the Oil Nationalization Movement.

Finally, in the section dealing with state-building performance of the two movements, the post-victory management thereof was examined. With the Oil Nationalization Movement, a nationalist government managed to come to power, but the irreconcilable disagreements between the religious and nationalist leaders of the Movement led to its downfall. Conversely, Imam Khomeini’s calculated, quick decisions, along with his adept management of intellectual, political and campaigning activities, bore the hallmarks of an all-encompassing leader whose reassuringly confident leadership prevented any discord at lower layers of management and steadily drove the revolution to victory. Most tellingly, while Imam Khomeini was the chief ideologist, mobilizer and manager of the revolution he had led all the way, the Oil Nationalization Movement suffered from a dual leadership where Ayatollah Kashani was in charge of mobilizing the people and Mosaddegh was the political leader and head of the Nationalist government, which ultimately landed it in defeat.
### Similarities

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*Figure 1 – Similarities and Differences between the Oil Nationalization Movement and the Islamic Revolution*
Figure 2 – Ideology and Leadership of the Islamic Revolution
Figure 3 – Ideology and Leadership of the Oil Nationalization Movement
References


